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Abstract 
Plato in his dialogue the Republic designs an ideal polis, the Kallipolis, seeking ‗justice, our 
good and the knowledge of the good required for understanding and bringing justice, 
happiness and good government into our lives and society‘ (Santas 2010, p.7). The first step 
in the Kallipolis‘ development is a polis without formal government whose citizens live a 
modest, stable, sustainable lifestyle. Disparaged by Glaucon as a polis for pigs, Socrates‘ 
incongruous rejoinder is ‗the true polis… is the one we‘ve described, the healthy one, as it 
were‘ (Rep. 372e). Contemporary commentators are critical of this polis, questioning its role 
in the Republic. In trying to understand the polis for pigs, and Socrates‘ praise thereof, I posit 
it is a village, and consider it has virtue, is good and its citizens are happy. However, despite 
being true and healthy, it is not the best or an ideal polis, but it is crucial to the development 
of the Kallipolis. 
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Preface 
This project has its origin in a coincidence of ideas, the phenomenon of two or more people 
with no apparent connection and separated by space or time, or both, developing similar 
ideas. In 2008, in celebration of Charles Darwin‘s 200th birthday and the 150th anniversary of 
the publication of On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, I delivered a lecture to the 
University of the Witwatersrand‘s Division of Human Genetics entitled A Reflection on 
Modified Mud.
1
 
Considering how life on earth began from ―modified mud‖ and the untold number of species, 
including Man, that subsequently evolved, I describe the different forms of Life and their effect 
on the environment. This is described by Charles Darwin in closing On the Origin of Species 
as:  
‗There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally 
breathed into a few forms or into one; and that whilst this planet has gone cycling on 
according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most 
beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved‘ (1859, p. 490). 
That was until the last 12 000 years of Man‘s existence and influence on earth. In those 12 000 
years, and particularly during the Anthropocene, the 250 years since the start of the Industrial 
Revolution, in a moment of time humankind ‗has thrown every fundamental, life-sustaining 
system on Earth off kilter‘ (Sachs, 2008, pp. 67-68) and caused the sixth, great extinction of 
species, but the ‗only one in which one species has pushed the others over the cliff‘ (Sachs, 
2008, p. 72). Cogitating on this, I proposed in my lecture that the current destruction of the 
environment can be directly attributed to humankind‘s unreasoned and avaricious behaviour, 
which, if our environment is to survive to sustain the over nine billion people expected on 
Earth by 2050, we will need to control. 
Early humankind, the San hunter-gathers, existed as small communities in a state of absolute 
scarcity on the edge of extinction. Living in nature as families they initially divided their 
                                                          
1 On evolution, Benjamin Disraeli, the British Prime Minister, opines at the Oxford Diocesan Conference in 1864 ‗Is man an 
ape or an angel? My Lord, I‘m on the side of the angels‘ (Browne, 2003, pp. 251-252).‘ In 1863 Sir Charles Lyell, renowned 
geologist whose ideas were central to Charles Darwin‘s theory of evolution, wrote to Thomas S Spedding ‗The question of 
the origin of species gave much to think of, and… cost me a great struggle to renounce my old creed. One of Darwin‘s 
reviewers put the alternative strongly by asking ‗whether we are to believe that Man is modified mud or modified monkey. 
The mud is a great come-down from the ‗archangel ruined.‘‘(Lyell, 1881, pp. 375-376). 
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labours on gender-based lines, with women gathering fruit, vegetables, small animals, insects 
and making the clothing, and men hunting large animals for meat and hides.  Both men and 
women assisted with raising the children.  
Co-operating and trading with each other individually and between communities, they moved 
continuously in search of the best resourced areas for food, water and clothing, and perhaps a 
little extra, if available, for occasional pleasure. The primary objective of these families and 
communities was survival and reproduction, thereby ensuring future continuity, and not the 
acquisition of possessions and wealth.
2,3,4 
Arguably one of the most significant events in humankind‘s history occurs 10 000 to 12 000 
years ago; the advent of settled village life or sedentism. The transition from a nomadic 
lifestyle to a settled existence was largely made possible by humankind‘s ability to reason and 
domesticate plants and animals. Now women and men did not have to dedicate their daily lives 
to the acquisition of food and other basic necessities. For the first time, the production of a 
sustainable supply of food provides the opportunity and time for reasoned thought and 
specialisation.
5
 
Subsequent improvements in agriculture and later the industrial production of goods ensured 
that life over the millennia was progressively more sustainable, with enough for the growing 
number of people to live,and increasingly a significant and growing percentage of people to 
exercise their excessive wants.
6
 
Over the last 65 years, in the face of ultimately finite and fragile resources, humankind has 
grossly overproduced both people and products.The overproduction of products is to satisfy the 
largely unreasoned expectations and demands for luxury, that is for ‗things which go beyond 
what is necessary for a city‘ (Rep., 373b), for the unconstrained upper and upper-middle 
classes— avaricious Man.7 In the process we ignore the poverty of billions, and do untold 
                                                          
2Leakey, 1979, pp. 148-149. 
3Schapera, 1930, pp. 75, 91. 
4
Wilson, 1978, pp. 82-83, 139. 
5Douglas S Massey, 2002, p.10. 
6When I developed the lecture in 2008 I had not read the Republic. Having done so for the first time in 2013 I can now 
equate ‗excessive wants‘ with Plato‘s ‗unnecessary, including lawless, appetitive  desires‘ following Reeve (1998, pp. 43-
47). 
7 From the 2008 World Bank Development Indicators, 20% of the World‘s people live on more than US $10/day (the 
reasonably well-off to wealthy), 30% (the poor) on less than US$10/day, with just under 50% (the abject poor) of the 
world‘s people surviving on less than US $2 a day. (My italics).    
Global Issues.[http://www.globalissues.org/article/26/poverty-facts-and-stats] 
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damage to the Earth and thus humankind‘s future.   I conclude that modern Man is no angel, let 
alone an Archangel
1, and to achieve resurrection ―will have to learn again to live to their needs 
and not their excessive wants‖.  
Some  2400 years prior to my ruminations, Plato, a Greek of aristocratic descent in the prime of 
mid-life, well-educated and travelled, a writer, soldier, politician for a limited time, wise from 
life‘s experience, philosophised on needs and desires. He associated them with humankind‘s 
motivations and in his seminal philosophical text the Republic related them to justice and 
injustice in his quest to define his ideal state, the Kallipolis.  
Approached from a different perspective from mine but with a similar concern in mind, the 
welfare of the polis, Plato‘s consideration offers a solution. Humankind must find a way to 
govern their excessive wants if justice is to prevail in the polis. 
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‗If you are designing an ideal society, as Plato does in the Republic, and contrasting it with 
the corruptions of existing societies, as he also does in the Republic, then you need to think 
about much more than political institutions in a narrow sense. You need to think about all the 
influences, all the ideas, images, and practices, that make up the culture of a society. I do not 
mean ―high culture‖, but culture in a more anthropological sense - the sense my dictionary 
defines as ―the total of the inherited ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, which constitute 
the shared bases of social action.‖ Even this definition is not broad enough, for it makes no 
mention of the material culture of a society - its characteristic artefacts, its buildings, even the 
kinds of landscape it creates. Plato did not forget the material culture.‘ 
M F Burnyeat, 1997, pp. 217-218. 
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1. Introduction 
In the Republic, in the context of a dramatic dialogue between Socrates, Plato‘s older brothers 
Glaucon and Adeimantus, and several associates on ‗the way we ought to live‘ (Rep. 352d),8 
Plato has Socrates offer an account of ‗justice, our good and the knowledge of the good 
required for understanding and bringing justice, happiness and good government into our 
lives and society‘ (Santas, 2010, p.7).  
To achieve this end, Socrates and his interlocutors discuss different societal states, each a polis
9
 
of a different nature, to seek and define justice and injustice in the polis. The first is 
Thrasymachus‘ state in which ‗justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger‘ (Rep. 
388c). Here the stronger are those ruling the state– ‗democracy makes democratic laws, 
tyranny makes tyrannical laws and so on for the others‘ (Rep. 338d-e). 
The second polis discussed is Glaucon‘s social contractarian polis (Rep. 358c-359c), in which 
justice is not intrinsically, but merely instrumentally, good. His contractarian theory is a new 
consideration for the circumstances and nature of justice, at that time.
10
 Here the weak band 
together to confront the strong and formulate an agreement with them so that both groups can 
live harmoniously, thus achieving justice. 
Socrates details his own account of the origin, development, nature and administration of 
justice in three poleis, culminating in the Kallipolis (Rep. Books II-V). He begins by 
describing how a polis theoretically comes into being, in order to see how justice and 
injustice originate therein (Rep. 369c-372d). What he develops is a settlement of craftsmen 
who are capable of providing for their needs and who live an apparently settled, modest and 
peaceful existence. 
The way of life in this nascent polis is rejected by Socrates' interlocutors, particularly Glaucon, 
who, referring to the polis‘s simple, bucolic lifestyle, disparages it as a polis for pigs. 
Subsequently, most commentators have followed suit, criticising the polis for pigs as being 
unrealistic, in respect of its structure, functioning and the character of its citizens. As such the 
role of polis for pigs in the Republic is questioned. 
                                                          
8 For this dissertation I am using the GMA Grube translation, revised by CDC Reeve, 1998. 
9 Here I am using the word polis following Grube (Rep. p. 44 [footnote]), for a community of people. This differentiates it 
from a ‗city‘, which is a misnomer. I will return to this issue later. 
10 Quote from Lycophron the alleged originator of contractarian theory (Aristotle, Politics, 1280b 7-11). 
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After Glaucon‘s criticism of the polis for pigs, Socrates, to accommodate Glaucon‘s 
expectations for, and perhaps given his social status his considered entitlement to a more 
civilised lifestyle, readily agrees to expand the polis into a luxurious polis, to ‗see how justice 
and injustice grow up in cities‘ (Rep. 372e). However, before proceeding, Socrates makes the 
seemingly throwaway remark that ‗[Y]et the true city (polis), in my opinion, is the one we‘ve 
described, the healthy one, as it were‘ (Rep. 372e). It is this statement that stimulated this 
study, and to which it is devoted to understanding. 
Given the breadth of vision and the attention to detail encompassed in Plato‘s exposition of 
the Kallipolis, his relatively sparse reflection on the polis for pigs (Rep. 369c-372e), which he 
considers to be the true and healthy polis, seems incongruous. With Socrates‘ riposte to 
Glaucon that the polis for pigs‘ ‗way of life won‘t satisfy some people‘ (Rep. 373a), one has 
to ask why so little has been written on the development, functioning and role of this polis in 
the Republic. 
‗The first polis (Rep. 369a-372d) is a notorious stumbling block to interpretation [of the 
Republic]‘ (Reeve, 1988, p.176). Donald Morrison supports this opinion, deeming the ‗city for 
pigs deeply puzzling‘, questioning if whether it is a false start and whether Socrates ‗abandons 
this first city because it has some fatal flaw‘ (2007, p. 250). Others question the likelihood, 
even the possibility, of its existence, criticise its functioning, and disparage the character of its 
citizens thereby diminishing its role in Plato‘s project. 
What then is this  polis for pigs, and what in its functioning and the behaviour and character 
of its citizens, lead authorities in the field to question it so severely, whilst Socrates, who 
always seeks knowledge and truth, sings its praises? 
In this dissertation I will try to answer the following questions. What is the polis for pigs and 
which features of it justify Socrates' description of it as true and healthy? Then, what is the 
polis for pigs’ relationship to the luxurious polis and the Kallipolis and what is its role in the 
Republic? Finally, derived from Dickinson (1931, p. 13-14), I will reflect on the relevance of 
the polis for pigs in today‘s global, riven unhappy polis. 
To achieve the above I will first describe the polis for pigs, which I deem a village, 
highlighting the issues that recommend this consideration. I will then describe the 
contemporary commentaries on the polis for pigs. What follows is my synthesis of what the 
polis for pigs represents, considering its relationship with the luxurious polis and the 
11 
 
Kallipolis, and responding to the considerations of contemporary critics. I will argue that 
Socrates is quite serious in positing that the polis for pigs is true and healthy, and why this 
polis exists and is a good polis, but not the best or ideal polis, and not Utopia. It is however, 
fundamental to the development of the Kallipolis, Plato‘s most beautiful polis.11 Finally, in a 
postscript, through the Songs of the Daughters of Necessity (Rep. 617c) I will address the 
relevance of the polis for pigs to today‘s global polis and to our future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11In proceeding I will further link (in footnotes) Plato‘s theory on the origin of the polis for pigs with relevant current social 
anthropological theory on the early social development of humankind. This is not to suggest that the polis for pigs is an 
original or early polis, but rather to highlight the issues involved in the early development of human communities, 
cooperation and sharing, division of labour and specialisation, are the same as documented by Plato and similarly relevant.  
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2. The Polis for Pigs 
The goal of this chapter is to describe the polis for pigs (Rep.369c-370e). I will begin by 
laying the groundwork for a discussion of the polis for pigs by describing its relationship to 
the other poleis. 
 
2.1.Developing the Kallipolis for justice 
Socrates delineates his theory of justice, both social and individual, by first inquiring into 
‗what sort of thing justice is in the polis, and afterward looking for it in the individual, 
observing the ways the smaller is similar to the larger‘ (Rep. 368e-369a). This approach 
assumes an isomorphism between justice in the state and justice in the individual. It initiates 
the discussion between Socrates and his interlocutors on designing ‗in theory‘12 the larger 
entity, the Kallipolis (Rep. 369a). This occurs through the sequential description of a series of 
poleis, each of which has a significant role in the development of the Kallipolis. As such, this 
description is not historical or an idealised view of the development of the Kallipolis. 
The conventional view is the Kallipolis is a Greek polis (Rep., 470e) that Socrates develops 
in three stages. The polis for pigs is the first stage, beginning as a small settlement of 
craftsmen working together to provide for the needs they require to live— food, shelter and 
clothing. Their needs grow, and with this the polis grows. When the polis is fully grown its 
citizens have ‗the economic necessities of city life in the fifth century BC‘ (Burnyeat, 1997, 
pp. 228- 229) giving thema simple, ordered, sustainable lifestyle, which, although modest 
ensures their happiness. 
The second stage is the development of the luxurious polis, driven by pleonexia, ‗the desire to 
outdo others and get more and more‘ (Rep. 359c), and ‗enjoying all the pleasant ―extras‖ of 
ancient Greek civilisation‘ (Burnyeat, 1997, p. 229). Created to meet Glaucon‘s requirements 
for a civilised life, Socrates enlarges the polis for pigs into a ‗luxurious polis… a polis with a 
fever‘ (Rep. 372e). Inflamed by ‗those same desires that are most of all responsible for the bad 
things that happen to cities (poleis) and the individuals in them‘ (Rep. 373e), citizens of the 
                                                          
12
Grube‘s translation, revised by Reeve, uses the word theory. Plato understands the concept of a theory, an idea or set of 
ideas that is suggested or presented as possibly true but that is not known or proven to be true, but knowing it will be tested 
in the future (Republic, 472c-e, 592b). 
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luxurious polis strive for ‗the endless acquisition of money… [having] overstepped the limit of 
their necessities‘ (Rep. 373d). 
The third stage is the regeneration of the luxurious polis through the implementation of 
justice and governance. The acquisition, education and appointment of Guardians to defend 
and administrate the polis stills the luxurious polis‘s fever (Rep. 399e). The Kallipolis then 
emerges when Rulers are selected from the Guardians. 
In an approach slightly different to other commentators, Christopher Reeve (1988, pp. 170-
172, 176) and Leo Strauss consider the luxurious polis when healed by the interventions of 
the Guardians as a separate entity. Reeve designates it the Second Polis and Strauss the ‗city 
of the armed camp‘ (1964, p. 64). From this polis the Kallipolis comes into being. 
Thus in the theoretical design of the Kallipolis, a polis with a constitution different to all 
others in its time, the polis for pigs is the first stage. Itis later incorporated into the Kallipolis, 
where its producers will be essential for its provisioning and economic viability (Rep. 463b). 
The Guardians regulate, maintain civic order and defend the polis, with the Rulers, 
functioning as a kingship or aristocracy (Rep. 445d), governing and preserving justice (Rep. 
463b), and thereby ensuring happiness for all its citizens.  
2.2. Founding a new polis 
In Socrates‘ view it is our individual inability to fulfil the numerous needs we each have that 
is the underlying principle on which a polis is founded and develops. Some needs are basic to 
everyone and must be fulfilled in order to live. These are bodily and material needs including 
food, clothing, and shelter. Thereafter, for the producer-citizens of this founding polis comes 
‗food, drink, sex and all things associated with them‘ (Rep., 581a) to ensure they fare well, 
lead a good life and are happy. For Guardians and Rulers, beyond the original material or 
bodily needs, are the needs of the soul, available to them in the Kallipolis.
13
 So, 
‗[B]ecause none of us is self-sufficient but we all need many things… and because 
people need many things, and because one person calls on a second out of one need, 
and on a third out of a different need many people gather together in a single place to 
live together as partners and helpers‘ (Rep. 369b-c). 
                                                          
13Following JRS Wilson, 1997, p. 315. 
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Need is therefore the wellspring of society. Because of each person‘s lack of self-sufficiency it 
is in their interests to rely on others to obtain what they need, whilst at the same time assisting 
their fellow citizens to fulfil their needs. To facilitate this mutual self-interest, they congregate 
and live in a particular place, associating as partners
14
 and helping each other, cooperating and 
so making it possible  to ‗share things with one another, giving and taking‘ because each 
believes this is in his best interest (Rep. 369c). This enacts the tenet of ‗the common good for 
the sake of each man‘s good‘ (Strauss, 1964, p. 94) for fulfilling the needs of both society and 
its citizens. Socrates thus defines a polis as an association of mutually cooperative citizens, 
living in a designated place, to fulfil their needs. 
The members of this association are partners; therefore their union is a partnership. ‗[I]t was 
for the sake of this (sharing) that we made their partnership and founded this city‘ (Rep. 
371b). Cooperating and sharing the products of the endeavour for the common good achieves 
functional reciprocity (Rep. 369c).
15,16  
These are the unwritten articles of their association, 
the contract between them (Rep. 333a). 
Having established that need is the progenitor of the development of poleis, Socrates initiates 
the development of the polis for pigs, with ‗Come, then, let‘s create a city (polis) in theory 
from its beginnings. And it‘s our needs, it seems, that will create it‘ (Rep.369c). The polis 
referred to here, following Wilson (1971, p. 314), can be considered the Kallipolis. ‗Its 
beginnings‘ is the polis for pigs, which will in time metamorphose into the part of the 
Kallipolis for its producers who will fulfil its economic needs. 
The initial needs of the citizens of the polis for pigs are food, clothing, shelter and health care 
(Rep. 369d). Different craftsmen, initially a farmer, builder, weaver, cobbler and doctor, 
become partners to provide the initial basic requirements for this settlement. The decision is 
made that each craftsman will work full time at his craft, not involving himself with the craft 
of others to fulfil his own different needs. Rather he will contribute all the efforts of his 
labour to the common weal (Rep. 369e-370a), to be shared amongst everyone, including 
himself. Thus the communal advantage of their association is advanced by the division of 
labour, this division being based on each person‘s natural ability (Rep. 370a).  
                                                          
14
Following Bloom, in his translation of Plato‘s Republic,  the use of the words  partners or partnership have their root in the 
word koinon, meaning ―common‖ or ―public‖. 
15‗There is, of course, one very special activity that is a particularly potent stimulus for group cooperation, and that is the 
sharing of food‘ (Leakey, 1979, p. 76). 
16
‗[H]umans could not have evolved in the remarkable way in which we undoubtedly have unless our ancestors were 
strongly co-operative creatures. The key to the transformation… into a cultural animal living in a highly structured and 
organised society is sharing‘ (Leakey, 1979, pp. 10-11.). 
15 
 
To maximise the advantage of the division of labour each craftsman specialises in the 
particular craft he is naturally suited for, working only in that craft and gaining expertise, 
rather than being involved concurrently in other crafts. This is to ensure a better job is done 
timeously as ‗the doer must of necessity pay close attention to his work rather than treating it 
as a secondary occupation… [so] more plentiful and better quality goods are more easily 
produced‘ (Rep. 370b-c). Thus the principle of specialisation is established. The citizens of 
this emergent polis can now fulfil their basic needs and thereby satisfy their desire
17
 to live 
and sustain life. 
Both division of labour and the principle of specialisation that follows are premised on each 
person‘s natural ability and talents, it being recognised that ‗each of us differs somewhat in 
nature from the others, one being suited to one task another to another‘ (Rep. 370a). Santas, 
following Rawls, refers to this as the ‗natural lottery assumption‘ (2010, p. 62). Because 
people are born with different capabilities and talents, in the polis for pigs the producers work 
in a trade best suited to their natural aptitude. This is inclusive of those less physically and 
intellectually endowed, who will later become partners as retailers, merchants and wage-
earners (Rep. 371c-e). 
Subsequently, in the Kallipolis, different capabilities and talents ultimately define not only 
people‘s crafts, but also their professions and social role or position, as division of labour and 
the principle of specialisation also apply to those in government. It will apply to those with 
silver and gold in their souls, the Guardians and Rulers (Rep. 415a).  
This emergent polis is thus a partnership of individuals with the requisite abilities to perform 
the crafts required to meet their basic needs, congregating in a small, agrarian settlement. 
They have no choice in this, other than autarky with all its implications (Rep. 370a). Initially, 
their circumstances are limited, so there can be no conflict of interest among them as this 
would jeopardise their project of ‗[living] together as partners and helpers‘ (Rep. 369c) to 
overcome their individual lack of self-sufficiency and provide the things they need to live. 
It is in this hamlet
18
 that Socratic justice originates with the principle of specialisation, 
following the natural division of labour. Socrates later finds this principle ‗rolling around at 
                                                          
17 Desires are for the things that individuals want. Gerasimos Santas clarifies that needs are more objective than desires and 
‗are not the same as desires: we may desire things that we do not need, and we may have a need for things for which we have 
no desire‘ (2010, p. 60). 
18McKeen characterises this hamlet (Rep., 369c-d) as ‗the embryonic micropolis’‘ (2004, p. 73). She also describes the 
lifestyle as ‗hardscrabble‘ (2004, p. 74) 
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our feet‘ (Rep. 432d,), when he institutes it as the principle of justice in the Kallipolis. There 
the principle of specialisation is interpreted as ‗[J]ustice… if you remember, [is] that 
everyone must practice one of the occupations in the city (polis) for which he is naturally best 
suited… justice is doing one‘s own work and not meddling with what isn‘t one‘s own‘ 
(Rep.433a-b). 
Also found in this hamlet, as a result of the need that brings these people together as partners, 
who help each other and cooperate and share, is unity. Unity is attainable in this hamlet and 
the completed polis for pigs, as conflicts of interest are minimised by the unwritten articles of 
their association, assisted by the principle of specialisation which dictates that people should 
not dabble in other peoples‘ trades (Rep.433a-b), and thus their livelihoods. 
As with justice produced by the principle of specialisation Socrates later moves to ensure 
unity in the Kallipolis. To him ‗there [is no] greater evil … for a city than that which tears it 
apart and makes it many instead of one… or any greater good than that which binds it 
together and makes it one‘ (Rep. 462a-b). Unity in the polis is necessary to assist in ensuring 
the polis‘s happiness (Rep. 412d-e, 420c, 421b-c). However, in the Kallipolis, unlike in the 
polis for pigs, this is conventional and is the responsibility of the Guardians (Annas, 1981, p. 
103). 
Unity, the principle of specialisation, and each craftsman contributing his labour, or the goods 
produced by his work, to the common purpose, enables the citizens of this hamlet to realise 
community interests and assure communal happiness. Through this process, because ‗each 
believes that this is better for himself‘ (Rep. 369c), each producer-partner fulfils his needs, 
satisfies his necessary desires and achieves personal happiness. This is perhaps encapsulated 
by the motto ―All for one, one for all‖.19 
This hamlet is too small to provide what is necessary for each craftsman to successfully 
perform his allotted task. More producer-partners are required to perform tasks, including 
making tools and animal husbandry (Rep. 370c-d), to support the original citizens in 
providing for the polis‘s needs. The hamlet thus grows into a polis that ‗won‘t be a huge 
settlement‘ (Rep. 370d) despite the increase in numbers.  
                                                          
19The motto of the Three Musketeers in the book of that name by Alexandre Dumas, (1844). 
Gutenberg Books Online. [http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/]. Accessed 9th September 2014. 
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2.3. Settling in 
For this polis to further provide for the citizens‘ needs it requires that products are imported 
from other poleis, in exchange for those which it produces for export. Therefore the citizens 
‗must produce not only enough for themselves at home but also goods of the right quality and 
quantity to satisfy the requirements of others‘ (Rep. 371a). This exchange is undertaken by 
merchants with the assistance of sailors, if the trade is by sea (Rep. 371a).  
The presence of sailors and sea trade indicates that this polis is at the coast. For this trade to 
be possible the polis for pigs’ citizens must produce a surplus after satisfying their own and 
the polis‘s needs, which its merchants can trade with other poleis for merchandise this polis 
requires.  This implies two things. Firstly, the polis will increase in size as sailors will be 
added to the population (Rep. 371a).  Secondly, the polis for pigs, together with its citizens, is 
not impoverished. 
However, before trading with other poleis, the citizens of the polis for pigs first need to share 
amongst themselves, ‗giving and taking‘ (Rep. 369c) the extra goods they produce to fulfil 
their own needs. These extra wares are taken to market to exchange with other citizens. If the 
craftsman is not able to exchange his products because nobody is there at the same time who 
wants to exchange with him, he can use the services of retailers thus allowing him to get back 
to work. Retailers are in the business of buying and selling (Rep. 371d), and will exchange 
the craftsman‘s goods for money; they in turn exchange these goods for money from those 
who want them (Rep. 371b-d). 
The market and currency is established ‗to enable the citizens to share what they have made‘ 
and the merchants and retailers aim to ‗facilitate the sharing of what people need; there is no 
indication in the text they are seeking money in this endeavour‘ (DeWeese-Boyd & 
DeWeese-Boyd, 2007, p. 119). The currency is used to facilitate exchange (Rep. 370b)
20
 
which accords with the polis‘s articles of association. Thus, in the first instance, the polis‘s 
economy is a mixed system of exchange using sharing, giving and taking, and currency as a 
token of exchange.
21
 Carter characterises this as the city-dweller (city-state citizen) living 
‗within a money economy and the countryman (rural villager) largely outside it‘ (1986, 
                                                          
20 Allen Bloom in his interpretive essay of his translation of the Republic notes of the polis for pigs that money is not of 
value in itself and is not pursued as an end in itself. That development would be the result of inflamed desires. Here money 
simply facilitates exchange (1968, p. 344).  
21Allen Bloom‘s translation (Rep., 371b) is ‗Out of this we'll get a market and an established currency as a token for 
exchange‘.  Aristotle also considers ‗money was introduced to facilitate exchange‘ (Politics, 1258b4). 
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p.81).What is described by Socrates appears to be an early description of a free market 
system of exchange and prioritising communal interests. 
When the polis for pigs is complete its citizens have gainful employment at crafts they are 
naturally suited to, trained for and experienced to perform well. They enjoy a lifestyle with 
adequate food, housing and clothing. In addition they have time to relax with their children, 
feasting with wine and delicacies, hymning the Gods, before enjoying responsible sex, but 
being careful not to have too many children.
22
 All their material and bodily needs are 
adequately fulfilled in what Burnyeat describes as a ‗moderately austere‘ lifestyle (1997, p. 
231). It affords them good health, longevity and is sustainable (Rep. 372a-d), and is a lifestyle 
sufficient to satisfy the necessary desires
23
 of its producer-citizens for ‗food, drink, sex and 
all things associated with them‘ (Rep. 581a). 
It is this polis with its modest but happy way of life that Glaucon disparages by asking 
Socrates if he were ‗founding a city (polis) for pigs… wouldn‘t you fatten them on the same 
diet‘ (Rep. 372d). When asked what he would feed these people with, Glaucon delineates his 
own expectations for a feast including couches and tables and delicacies and desserts. What 
follows is the development of the luxurious polis. 
Socrates‘ description of the polis for pigs offers no mention of government and its attendant 
institutions and instruments. Despite this its citizens ‗live in peace‘ (Rep. 372d), 
recommending that there is little internal strife in this polis and it has good relations with its 
neighbours. Its citizens are no longer poor, but they do not enjoy wealth.
24
 One of the future 
responsibilities of the Guardians is to ensure the producers in the Kallipolis do not 
accumulate wealth, ‗which makes a craftsman and his products worse… [and results in] 
luxury, idleness and revolution‘ (Rep. 421d-422a). The implication is that the citizens of the 
polis for pigs are certainly not wealthy. 
                                                          
22No mention of family is made in Socrates‘ account of the origin and development of this polis. As this was in the 5th 
century BCE (Burnyeat, 1997, p. 229) the family would have been an accepted part of society. There is no reason to consider 
the family was not a part of the polis for pigs. Perhaps, however,  this omission and the manner in which Socrates describes 
sex at the feast at Rep., 372b are, as suggested by Burnyeat, indicative that Socrates ‗is sketching a primitive anticipation of 
the arrangements he will propose for the ideal city, where the family is abolished in favour of communality of women and 
children (1997, p. 230).  
23
Necessary desires are those which we cannot resist or which are beneficial to the individual. The desires which we cannot 
resist are those whose satisfaction is required by nature for life. Unnecessary desires are those that go beyond necessary 
desires. Thus unnecessary desires are those that relate to excessive want. Lawless desires are those that ‗free of all control by 
shame or reason… omits no act of folly or shamelessness… [and are] a dangerous, wild and lawless form of desire‘ (Rep., 
571c-572b). They are responsible for the worst crimes and injustice. 
24Wealth. A comparativeabundance of things which are objects of human desire; esp., abundance of worldly estate; 
affluence; opulence; riches.   Webster‘s Online Dictionary. [http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/wealth]. 
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Needs grow with the increasing size and complexity of this community, but necessary desires 
and mutual interests continue to coincide and are fulfilled by the citizens‘ communal efforts. 
If one accepts Rawls‘ definition of the circumstance of justice25, then the exigencies of the 
situation and the citizens‘ needs dictate the circumstances of its justice. The application of the 
principle of specialisation, following natural division of labour, and cooperation and sharing 
following on their partnership, ensure justice and unity in this communal venture. 
If a polis is broadly defined as a community of people
11
 then this polis is the first polis, with 
the interpretation of its title continually open to equivocation in translating the word ―polis‖. 
It can be anything from a hamlet or village to how Aristotle conceives a polis, which is a 
‗city-state‘ resulting from numerous villages combining.26 
Socrates conceives a polis as an association of mutually cooperative people, thus a 
community, living in a designated place, to fulfil their needs. Given his description of the 
polis  for pigs, a polis of producer-citizens, without formal government and its residents 
living a simple, ordered, sustainable lifestyle which meets their needs, suggests that this is a 
village, comprising a community of men, women and children, of possibly several hundred to 
just over a thousand strong.
27,28
 As such it can, depending on your viewpoint, be the polis for 
pigs, that is the polis of the ignorant (Burnyeat, 1997, p.231), or more empathetically the 
kōmē29 of producers. 
Finally, in describing need as the wellspring of society right from ‗its beginnings‘, Socrates 
has made ‗[sharing] things with one another, giving and taking, [as] each believes it is better 
for himself‘ (Rep. 369c), that is cooperation and sharing, the primordial social relationship of 
society. The consequence of this is ‗[I]f Socrates is right… when he says that man‘s needs 
can only be satisfied through cooperation with others then it follows that society is natural 
and indeed necessary to man‘ (Wilson, 1977, p. 318). This is in contrast with the 
contractarian polis in which Glaucon proposes the circumstances of justice are a presumably 
                                                          
25‗The circumstances of justice may be described as the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible 
and necessary‘ (Rawls, 1971, p. 126). 
26Aristotle in Politics (1252b9-1253a, 1261b13-14, 1289a14-17) delineates a ‗city-state‘ as a larger, autonomous, self-
sufficient polis, with government and thus city hall (a meeting place) and a constitution. It develops from the merging of 
several villages (also a polis in the broad sense of the word community of people). A village is the association of several 
households (male head, female, children and slaves and also a polis in the broad sense of the word). 
27
Wagstaff, 1975, p. 163. Such villages were common in ancient Greece at that time. On the basis of a population of 1000 to 
1200 people consisting of male citizens, each with a wife and three to four children (~5,5 per family), this village could have 
between 180 to 220 families.  There may have been some slaves in this village, a farmer owning perhaps one or two (Carter, 
1986, p. 77), but are not included in this calculation.  
28The population of the Kallipolis, for comparison, is calculated as 27 720 people, comprising adult male citizens and their 
families (~5,5 persons per family). Metics, foreigners and slaves are not included in the calculation (Annexure I). 
29
Kōmē. Village. 
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anarchic state of nature in which men are predatory, with each harming the other to gain what 
they want. It is their desire to avoid this harm that leads to the mutual agreement resulting in 
government, law and justice. Hence justice in this instance is artificial and a compromise.
30,31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30Wilson, 1977, p. 317. 
31
Santas, 2010, p. 60. 
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3. Contemporary Commentaries on the Polis for Pigs 
Socrates designs the kōmē of producers, his true and healthy polis, to represent a polis that 
fulfils the needs of its producer-citizens. Contemporary commentators, when discussing the 
polis for pigs, align into two basic positions. Most commentators, naysayers, disagree with 
Socrates‘ appreciation of the polis for pigs, considering it either ironic or wrong, thereby 
diminishing its role in Plato‘s project. They question the possible existence of such a polis, its 
structural arrangements, and the nature and character of its inhabitants. By contrast aye-
sayers accept Socrates‘ praise of the polis for pigs and seek to explain and justify its role in 
the Republic. 
Nevertheless, all commentators agree that the polis for pigs originates because of its citizens‘ 
individual insufficiency and their self-interest in fulfilling their needs (Rep. 369b-c). It is also 
Plato‘s first step in the development of the Kallipolis. 
3.1. Naysayers 
These contemporary critics have difficulty in defining the polis for pigs and its role in the 
Republic. They deem the polis for pigs design is deficient for several reasons. The first is that 
the polis does not have formal government and its institutions. Secondly, the character of the 
polis is deficient as neither justice nor injustice exists therein or it lacks progress and the 
aspects of civilisation that this brings to society. Thirdly, the character of its producer-citizens 
is deficient in that they lack unnecessary appetitive desires. Alternatively, the citizens do in 
fact have the full range of appetitive desires, but since the polis has no formal government 
institutions, it is unable to prevent them exercising their unnecessary appetitive desires and 
lapsing into pleonexia. 
These views are clearly held by both Rachel Barney, who considers the polis for pigs an 
‗impossible city‘ (2001, pp. 217-218[n.10]), and Julia Annas, whose insightful analysis 
concludes ‗that Plato has not given the first city a clear place in the Republic‘s moral 
argument… [it] adds nothing, except a context in which the Principle of Specialization is 
introduced‘ (1981, pp. 78-79). Annas‘ claim in severely limiting the polis for pigs‘ role in the 
Republic obviously also denies that the polis can be true and healthy.  
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3.1.1. Alleged flaws in the polis for pigs 
a. Lack of formal government  
This structural defect of the polis for pigs relates to its apparent lack of formal government.
32
 
Barney summarises this by stating that ‗what daily life does not here include is most striking, 
namely no military, no constitution, rulers, or political activity‘ (2001, p. 213). As such they 
consider the polis for pigs is defective ‗because it includes nothing to counteract the 
destabilizing effects of unnecessary appetites and the pleonexia to which they give rise‘ 
(Reeve, 1988, p. 171). That is the polis for pigs has no government or its institutions, including 
an army, to counteract pleonexia and the external threat of attack during war, or the internal 
threat of civil strife. In the Kallipolis Guardians are present to control and oppose these threats. 
b.The absence of justice or injustice in the polis for pigs 
Ian Crombie considers the description of the polis for pigs in Book II to be a ‗false start‘ 
because neither justice nor injustice are to be found in it (1962, pp. 89-90). He believes that the 
description was perhaps not removed from an earlier version of the Republic. 
c. The polis for pigs’ lack of progress and civilisation 
Richard Nettleship denies the polis for pigs’ likely existence because its inhabitants, living only 
to their needs, and having a lifestyle of ‗idyllic innocence [and] animal simplicity… [is] devoid 
of progress… [and it] excludes the greater part of the elements that make up human life as we 
know it; it excludes civilisation‘ (1920, p. 72). In noting the lack of elements of civilisation he 
is perhaps, different to Glaucon, referring to art, literature and philosophy, including natural 
philosophy or sciences, which are obviously not present in the polis for pigs. 
3.1.2. The personae of the citizens of the Polis for Pigs 
Jonas et al clearly and simply classify the personae and problems related to the appetitive 
human nature of the polis for pigs’ citizens. They also present arguments to counter these 
issues(Jonas et al., 2012, pp. 342- 352). 
a. On being less than human 
                                                          
32
Most naysayers, including Rachel Barney, Daniel Devereux, Christopher Reeve and Christopher Rowe refer to the polis 
for pigs’lack of a formal system of government. 
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The minority position is that the kōmē’s producer-citizens‘ characters do not have the full range 
of human appetitive desires, thus they cannot represent ‗a plausible human community‘ (Jonas 
et al., 2012, p. 343). In essence, this talks to the lack of unnecessary appetitive desires that 
result in pleonexia but which motivates the civilised lifestyle called for by Glaucon. John 
Cooper
33
 details this position cogently, contrasting justice in Glaucon‘s contractarian polis with 
that in the polis for pigs. He clearly explains how the apparent lack of unnecessary appetitive 
desires in the citizens of the polis for pigs recommends that by only being motivated by their 
necessary desire to achieve their good, individually and mutually, they cannot be truly just.  
There is nothing to tempt them into pleasurable gratification, cheating, freeloading and other 
unjust actions. This arises in the luxurious polis, where injustice is palpable, and true justice 
only exists in those who seek to do what is right in the face of temptation.
34
 
b. On being normal producer-citizens 
The second and majority position on the character of the kōmē of producers’ citizens is that 
they do have the normal appetitive desires, both necessary and unnecessary. However, this 
means that it is inevitable that the polis for pigs will fail as the structural deficiency of the 
polis— no formal system of government and its institutions— will not prevent its citizens 
exercising their unnecessary appetitive desires, resulting in pleonexia driven degeneration into 
injustice and chaos; in essence into the luxurious polis or worse a state of nature as 
presupposed for Glaucon‘s contractarian polis. 
If Socrates considers the polis for pigs true and healthy, the question is why he allows a 
situation where this polis will inevitably fail due to the inability of its citizens to control their 
appetitive desires? To some commentators this is confirmation that Socrates‘ praise of the polis 
for pigs is ironic. 
Obviously, in considering Socrates‘ praise to be ironic implies that these naysayers do not 
consider the polis for pigs true and healthy. That being the case, given that they consider the 
polis for pigs is the first step in the development of the Kallipolis, what does this step 
represent? Seemingly, as part of the whole that is to materialise, the polis for pigs would then 
be like a vestigial limb, which as Annas posits, is only useful to introduce the principle of 
specialisation.  
                                                          
33 Cooper, 2000, pp. 5-27 
34 Jonas et al, whilst accepting the validity of Cooper‘s argument, consider it unsound as the first premise is false, justifying 
this by quoting Socrates‘ (Rep. 572b) and Glaucon‘s (Rep. 359c) opinions that everyone has both necessary and unnecessary 
appetites. 
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Barney broaches the topic directly stating that ‗it would be overstraining human nature to 
expect this acorn-eating
35
 simplicity to last: humans will rebel and demand more…. The polis 
for pigs depending on a suspension of the realities of human nature is thus an impossible city‘ 
(2001, pp. 215, 217-218 [n.10]). Reeve follows suit noting that the polis for pigs citizens are 
ruled by their necessary appetitive desires. There is no philosophising, therefore no 
philosophers, and no fighting, therefore no honour-lovers. Its populace therefore does not have 
the means to defend itself against pleonexia driven internal strife or outside aggression, and 
with no philosophers to rule it has no means of access to the good and thus cannot assure 
happiness. He concludes that the polis for pigs ‗is stable only in a fantasy world in which 
people never pursue pleonectic satisfaction, never lose control of themselves or succumb to 
akrasia‘ (Reeve, 1988, p. 178). 
3.1.3. A concluding naysayer commentary 
The final word goes to the measured opinion of Christopher Rowe from The Place of the 
Republic in Plato’s Political Thought.36 He suggests that the Republic can be viewed as ‗a 
political work‘  wherein politics ‗is a matter of reconciling interests in the community, [that 
is] of finding ways in which different groups can scratch along besides each other‘ (2007, p. 
28). 
Recognising that the polis for pigs ‗differs from any ordinary city in that the causes of conflict, 
and the things that cause the overdevelopment of our irrational desires, have not yet been 
introduced (2007, p. 44 [n22])... and has no political institutions [to counteract these]… he 
[however] defers from considering it a truly ―Socratic‖ community, as there is no mention of 
the inhabitants doing philosophy‘ (2007, p. 44). He concedes that as this polis has Socrates‘ 
approval, ‗it perhaps goes without saying that they will [come]‘ (2007, p. 44). 
3.1.4. The true nature of humankind 
Daniel Devereux (1979, pp. 36-40) has the sentiments of a naysayer. In his paper Socrates’ 
first city in the Republic he seeks to address the true nature of humankind. Is human nature the 
pleonexia driven nature of the unjust man portrayed in the pre-political state of Glaucon‘s 
contractarian polis in which ‗injustice is natural to man while justice is unnatural and contrary 
                                                          
35 Barney quoting Socrates‘ description of ‗roasting acorns‘  as part of the description of the lifestyle of the polis for pigs’ 
citizens considers this, following Lovejoy and Boas (1935), to be a symbol of primitive scarcity (Barney, 2001, p. 214).  
This is different to the conventional view that acorns allude to sex.  
36Rowe, 2007, pp. 27-54. 
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to nature‘ (1979, p. 38)? Alternatively, is it as Socrates considers like the citizens of the polis 
for pigs who are naturally endowed with characteristics which make possible a mutually 
beneficial system of cooperation and are thus fitted by nature for communal living? In this 
Devereux questions Socrates‘ opinion of the polis for pigs’ citizen‘s character and if they are 
capable of cooperation and sharing. 
Glaucon‘s contractarian theory of justice (Republic, 358e-359a-c) describes, as previously 
discussed, a state of nature in which moderate scarcity of goods, humankind‘sself-seeking 
nature, rough equality of capabilities, and minimal rationality pertain.  To overcome this state 
of nature, the collective weak contract with the strong to ensure neither group will harm the 
other.
37
 
By contrast the polis for pigs with no initial state of nature and no obvious formal government 
has natural justice and a modest, peaceful, sustainable lifestyle based on mutual cooperation 
and sharing between its citizens. Devereux asks the question:                                                                                                                      
‗What sort of life is most natural for men— that is, most in accordance with their nature— in 
the absence of law and government?‘(1979, p. 38). 
Devereux immediately states that life in accordance with man‘s nature, in the absence of laws 
or government, is a condition which has never existed, and most naysayers would agree with 
him.
38
 However, he considers that Socrates, in highlighting natural cooperation in the 
harmonious polis for pigs, is repudiating Glaucon‘s ‗stress on the naturalness of strife and 
selfishness… [and obviously he] does not regard pleonexia as an essential and ineradicable 
component of human nature‘ (1978, p. 38).     
Rather, ‗Socrates regards man as fitted by nature for communal living and cooperative 
endeavour… for their mutual benefit‘ (1978, p. 40). In the absence of government and law, 
this does not seem possible in a polis. Such a community would be feasible only if peoples‘ 
desires are limited to necessary desires and thus the ‗rationale for Socrates limitation on 
desires in the first city‘ (1978, p. 40). Thus for Devereux pleonexia has primacy over 
cooperation and sharing in humankinds‘ nature, setting him alongside most naysayers albeit 
he approaches the issue from a different perspective. 
                                                          
37
Santas, 2010, pp. 38-40. 
38Based on the consideration that man is by nature a political animal (Aristotle, Politics, 1253a) and has always had 
government this may seem correct. Current knowledge of humankinds‘ early social existence suggests it is not. Aristotle did 
not have this knowledge available to him.  
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3.2. Aye-sayers 
Having delineated why Socrates‘ praise of the polis for pigs should not be taken at face value 
we can turn to those who support his contention that the polis for pigs is true and healthy and 
the role they define for it in the Republic. 
3.2.1 The lucky polis 
Catherine McKeen
39
 labels the polis for pigs Swillsburg,
40
 and considers it is true and 
healthy. In her detailed and discerning analysis of the polis for pigs, she, like others, 
compares it to the Kallipolis. By comparison she considers it limited and inferior, but better 
than the other poleis in the Republic, and wishes to discern ‗if some serious moral is to be 
read in Plato‘s characterisation of the city of pigs‘ (2007, p. 74). 
Central to her thesis is that Swillsburg is a healthy, true and good community based on its 
unity, albeit that she does not consider this ‗the right kind of unity‘ (2004, p. 71). Unity is 
necessary for any polis, community or group to function (Rep. 351c-d), and ‗groups divided by 
disparity and divergent interests will be unable to undertake any common projects‘ (Rep. 351d-
352d) (2004, p.82).  Poverty and wealth within a polis divides it (Rep. 421c-423b), and division 
in the polis is anathema to Socrates (Rep. 462a-b) as it causes disunity resulting in the demise 
of a polis.  
Unity for McKeen is premised on three principles, the first two of which the polis for pigs has, 
but is deficient in the third. Despite this she considers there are ‗deep morals to be read 
concerning civic unity in the city of pigs‘ (2004, p. 74).  
McKeen‘s first principle is that of size. Here I am in accord with her, although we differ as to 
what we consider the actual size of the polis for pigs. Pointing out that a polis should only ‗be 
allowed to grow such that it is a unity‘ (2004, p. 86), she considers the polis for pigs fits 
between her micropolis (my hamlet) and the luxurious city with respect to its way of life. The 
luxurious polis is too large, having in addition to those of the polis for pigs, numerous frivolous 
crafts leading to over population.  
Her second principle, for which I also have regard, is specialisation, which is present in the 
polis for pigs. Recognising the diversity in human communities, with inhabitants working at 
                                                          
39McKeen, 2004, pp. 70-92. 
40Intuitively, this brings to mind a rural American town. 
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different occupations, she advances that ‗some degree of unity is achieved… through the 
principle of specialization… insofar as individuals specialize in their technai, and insofar as 
these technai provide for some efficient meeting of human needs‘ (2004, p. 83). Thus the polis 
for pigs‘ correct size and the practice of specialization contribute to its unity and moderate way 
of life, which McKeen considers less-regulated and preferable in many ways to that of the 
Kallipolis as ‗one enjoys the simple pleasures of life, manages one‘s own affairs and relaxes 
with one‘s family‘ (2004, p. 73).   
The third principle, which McKeen considers unifies the polis for pigs, is that of enlightened 
self-interest. On this principle we disagree. In her view, this makes it a mutual benefit society, 
wherein citizens trade and exchange the products of their labour because they will personally 
benefit and ‗not out of altruistic concern for the good of the whole community‘ (2004, p. 85). 
The citizens consciously restrain their appetitive desires to avoid the adverse consequences of 
unnecessary desires. This, in her terms, is ‗enlightened, self-regarding interest‘ (2004, p.90). In 
essence, private interests predominate in McKeen‘s polis for pigs, and its citizens only 
instrumentally value its justice, civic unity and the polis itself.  
In the polis for pigs, unlike the Kallipolis, there is no formal government to ‗[minimize] or 
radically re-interpret‘ (2004, p. 91) private interests and guard against other risks, the 
eventuality of which would lead to disarray and disunity in the community. So the polis for 
pigs is ‗unified, healthy, true and happy… to an extent… [but] is better than any of the other 
non-Kallipolis alternatives‘ (2004, p.92). However, its continuing existence is largely 
dependent upon ‗lucky circumstances which allow individual self-interests to coincide‘ 
(2004, p. 71). This makes it inferior to the Kallipolis, as a polis whose unity is so dependent 
on circumstances cannot be truly just or happy.  
3.2.2. A polis more ideal than the Kallipolis? 
Three co-authors, Jonas et al,
41
 wholeheartedly support the first polis, considering that 
‗Socrates genuinely believes the city is healthy and desirable… and is superior to the 
Kallipolis‘ (2012, p. 332). Their claim, therefore, recommends that the polis for pigs is the 
best polis in the Republic and that Socrates means for a polis to be true and healthy is the 
ideal. 
                                                          
41Jonas et al, 2012, pp. 333-334. 
28 
 
Socrates‘ has high praise for the polis for pigs, which he does not explain or justify after 
Glaucon‘s challenge, and which he never explicitly returns to or rescinds. This raises doubts 
as to whether his praise of the polis for pigs is genuine. Most commentators believe that 
whilst he ‗never explicitly rescinds his praise of the First City, he indirectly does so in later 
passages in the Republic…and they offer theoretical and exegetical evidence that purportedly 
demonstrates the inferiority of the First City‘ (Jonas, 2012, pp. 342-334).  
Their counter view is that the polis for pigs is deserving of Socrates‘ commendation and that he 
prefers it to the Kallipolis.  The apparent ease with which Socrates moves from the polis for 
pigs to describing the luxurious polis, at Glaucon‘s bidding, causes critics to readily dismiss his 
praise of the former or to consider it ironic. To counter this, Jonas et al begin their argument 
following Rowe (2007, pp. 43-45). 
Rowe believes that Socrates is satisfied with his exposition of justice in Book I, but 
acknowledges that Glaucon, Adeimantus and others are not convinced. To further defend 
justice, thereby satisfying the needs of others and not necessarily himself, Socrates embarks on 
his further explanation of justice in Book II-V. He constructs the Kallipolis ‗as an analogy for 
the good, and therefore just, individual or soul‘ (2007, p. 43), beginning the construction with 
the polis for pigs, which he considers true, thus also good and just. By comparison the 
luxurious polis is fevered, with Socrates readily undertaking its construction to help extend the 
search ‗[to] see how justice and injustice grow up in cities‘ (Rep. 372a). 
Glaucon is unaware of the justice in the polis for pigs, and that his demand for a polis suitable 
to his expectations indicates that he does not recognize his appetitive desires are unnecessary 
and a feature of injustice. Therefore Socrates develops the Kallipolis to demonstrate to Glaucon 
and Adeimantus the meaning of injustice and justice, through their propagation in the luxurious 
polis and the Kallipolis. Socrates spends considerable effort constructing the fevered polis, and 
then curing its fever in the Kallipolis, to still Glaucon‘s fever, and to get him to understand 
justice and desire it for himself. Socrates does this despite having previously constructed the 
just polis - his true and healthy polis. This is, in summary, why Socrates expends the effort 
developing the Kallipolis, and why he considers the polis for pigs superior to the Kallipolis.  
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4. Revisiting the Kōmē of Producers 
‗Yet the true polis, in my opinion, is the one we‘ve described, the healthy one, as it were‘ 
(Plato, Republic, 372e). 
It is this statement, so obviously incongruous in the greater scheme of the Republic, which 
initiated this project. To many scholars of the Republic, this ―throw-away‖ comment seems 
inappropriate. The majority opinion is that it represents Socratic irony and that even Socrates 
did not believe this to be the case. Following Morrison (2007, p. 241), I have a ‗tin ear‘ for 
the irony in this instance, believing that Socrates meant what he said, and as previously 
stated, perhaps the dramatic incongruity of the statement is inviting you to consider it more 
deeply. 
4.1. A new synthesis 
To validate Socrates‘ consideration that the polis for pigs is a true and healthy polis, given the 
scepticism about its possibility and the reservations about its inhabitants and its role in the 
Republic, a new synthesis is necessary to supplement the understanding of this polis, still the 
doubts of naysayers and replace them with a cogent aye-sayer‘s view. In this I talk to the 
political endeavour of ‗designing an ideal society‘ (Burnyeat, 1997, p. 217), starting at its 
beginnings, the kōmē of producers. 
To solve this conundrum first requires an interpretation of what Socrates actually means 
when lauding the polis for pigsas true and healthy. This is obviously a clear endorsement of 
the polis for pigs but does this indicate that Socrates considers it to be the best or the ideal 
polis in the Republic? There is no consensus in the literature on this issue. 
Jonas et al accept at face value Socrates‘ praise of the polis for pigs and consider it to be the 
best polis in the Republic. This means they consider that a polis that is true and healthy is the 
ideal polis. Given the role of the polis for pigs in the overall scheme of the Republic and that 
it is a polis of a limited population size comprising only producers this view seems hard to 
sustain. However, this interpretation of Socrates' meaning is shared by some naysayers who 
seem to think that Socrates means to say that the polis for pigs is an ideal. However, the 
relationship between this ideal and the Kallipolis remains unclear, and because of the 
problems they identify in the polis‘s structure, functioning and the behaviour of its citizens, 
they infer that Socrates must be speaking ironically.  
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McKeen‘s position falls between these two views. Accepting Socrates‘ accolade of the polis 
for pigs at face value she considers this polis better than other poleis in the Republic, but 
limited and inferior to the Kallipolis. It is therefore a good polis, but not the best or ideal 
polis. My position accords with that of McKeen, albeit that I derive my position in a manner 
different to hers. 
In proceeding I will delineate what I consider Socrates means by the polis for pigs being true 
and healthy, consolidate my position that the kōmē of producers is a village and clarify its 
relationship with the Kallipolis. In the process, to convince critics that the kōmē of producers 
is worthy of Socrates‘ accolade, I will respond to contemporary commentators‘ positions on 
the kōmē’s structural flaws and the problems relating to its producer-citizens‘ personae. 
4.1.1. On the kōmē of producers being true and healthy 
What is it in this village that makes it ‗the true polis… the healthy one, as it were‘ (Rep. 
372e), inducing Socrates to later incorporating its principles and way of life into the 
Kallipolis? This tribute, on my reading, does not make the kōmē either the best polis or an 
ideal polis. What makes it true and healthy, without an obvious reason given in its 
description, is a point of conjecture. Although irony may be taken to mean saying something 
different from what is actually meant, I do not believe that Socrates is ironic in this instance. I 
will argue, following McKeen, that Socrates uses the word ―true‖ to indicate a unified 
society, and in my opinion, ―healthy‖ to highlight that the polis for pigs has the essential 
virtue – justice. 
On my reading, civic unity is the main but not the only reason which makes the kōmē of 
producers true and healthy. The decision to ‗live together as partners and helpers‘ (Rep.369c) 
in this village, cooperating and sharing, and augmented by the principle of specialisation, 
binds the citizens of the kōmē of producers together into a cohesive community. These 
principles also maintain the unity of the kōmē’s citizens in the face of their challenges, and 
ensure the equitable sharing of the products of their labours.
42
 There is another issue that 
contributes to their unity. The citizens gather not only as partners, but also as helpers (Rep. 
369c), and this collegiality assists in maintaining their unity. 
                                                          
42As there is neither poverty nor wealth in the community it must be assumed that the distribution of the kōmē’s gross 
product is shared evenly amongst the partners. 
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Unity in a polis is that which Socrates considers allows a polis to be a polis. All other poleis, 
because of the divisions within them, are themselves two or more poleis. Two such poleis 
within a polis are the wealthy and the poor, who are always at war with each other (Rep.422e-
423a). Thus the kōmē of producers, because of the unwritten articles of association of a 
collegial partnership, assisted by the principle of specialisation, andsince it has neither wealth 
nor poverty, is a unified polis. On the basis of this unity it is a naturally true polis. 
The kōmē of producers also has health which contributes to it being true. Besides the fact that 
this kōmē’s way of life is peaceful, stable and sustainable, which ensures the rude health of its 
inhabitants, the kōmē of producers has health in another form. It has justice,which is a virtue, 
‗a kind of health‘ (Rep. 444e). Justice, natural justice in this instance, is consequent upon the 
principle of specialisation, following from division of labour and,  
‗[makes] the city (polis) good by its presence… and has the power that makes it 
possible for them (the other virtues wisdom, courage, moderation) to grow and, 
preserves them … as long as it (justice) remains there itself… [it] rivals wisdom, 
moderation and courage in its contribution to the virtue of the city‘ (Republic, 433a-e). 
However, justice is only one of the virtues required to make a polis completely good (Rep. 
427e) and thus an ideal polis. There is still much to be done before the kōmē’s unity and 
justice are successfully applied in the larger setting of the Kallipolis to ensure that polis‘s 
complete virtue, goodness and the happiness of all its city-state citizens. Although unity and 
justice make the kōmē of producers true and healthy, thus, to some extent, a virtuous and 
good polis, it is not the best or the ideal polis. That is still to come in the Kallipolis. 
a. A further consideration on unity in the kōmē of producers 
Catherine McKeen, in her well-considered paper on Swillsburg posits that there are three 
principles which underpin the kōmē of producers’ civic unity. On the first two principles, the 
polis‘s size and the principle of specialisation, we concur, although I believe the polis for pigs 
is a village, smaller than the town she conceives. On the third principle we disagree.  
Based on its citizens‘ ‗enlightened, self-regarding interest‘ (2004, p.90), which McKeen 
considers induces them to consciously restrain their pleonexic desires, Swillsburg is a mutual 
benefit society.This contrived coincidence of enlightened self-interest ensures that private 
interest, and thus personal good, comes before  public interest and thus collective good, in 
Swillsburg. It is this which she believes makes the polis for pigs deficient compared to the 
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Kallipolis, and which requires re-ordering, through state control, for the Kallipolis to come into 
being. It is also what separates her view on the reasons for the kōmē of producers‘ unity, from 
my approach. 
Socrates‘ discussion on the kōmē of producers is largely centred on functional reciprocity and 
specialisation producing economic and distributive justice for the community. McKeen‘s 
consideration of alleged enlightened self-interest in this polis evokes thoughts of Adam Smith‘s 
theory of the invisible hand.  
‗Every individual necessarily labours to rend the annual revenue of the society as great 
as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor know 
how much he is promoting it… he intends only his own security; and by directing that 
industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value he intends only 
his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which is no part of his intention.... By pursuing his own interest he 
frequently promotes that of society… I have never known much good done by those 
who affect to trade for the public good‘ (1776, p. 572).  
Surely this is one of the most well-known expositions of enlightened self-interest, and a 
cornerstone of the modern market.  
Conversely, the citizens of the polis for pigs gather in the hamlet as a partnership to achieve 
their collective purpose to provide for their needs, and continue in like vain in order to 
improve their circumstances. In this partnership, paraphrasing Smith, they ‗[labour] to render 
the annual [product] of the society as great as [they] can‘ (1776, p. 572), and they share that 
product. There are no invisible hands in the partnership— all hands are above board and 
visible from the beginning. The end, which is part of each individual‘s intention, and which 
he applies himself to through cooperation, sharing and the principle of specialisation, is to 
promote the public interest, not his own gain. His own security is reliant on that public 
interest and his own gain, over and above that of his fellow citizens, would be in conflict with 
the articles of association of the partnership.  
Enlightened self-interest places self at the forefront, before others; the mutual interest of the 
polis for pigs‘ citizens places the polis first and the attainment of the group‘s interests ensures 
that individual interests are achieved. Therefore, the marketplaces envisioned by Socrates and 
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Smith are in two different poleis, separated by time and underlying political and economic 
philosophy.  
Luck and the contrived coincidence of individual enlightened self-interest has little to do with 
the success or failure of the kōmē of producers as is suggested by McKeen. Rather, the 
kōmē’s success is consequent upon the rational choice of its citizens to work together to 
achieve their mutual interests thus ensuring their individual interests align. Failure, should it 
occur, is down to fate— but every polis and every person is subject to its vicissitudes. 
In considering that the citizens of Swillsburg only instrumentally value its justice, civic unity 
and the polis itself, McKeen is, on my reading, incorrect. It is in villages, like the kōmē of 
producers, that the citizens truly understand and respect the virtue of communal unity and the 
good that it achieves. This good may be the simple life they live, which means they are 
deemed ignorant, but they are intelligent enough to realise that the unity of their partnership 
is fundamental to their wellbeing and happiness. 
4.1.2. On being a kōmē 
Different poleis are described or alluded to in the Republic. Each is a polis of a different 
nature but each is a polis in the sense that they are communities of people.
9 
Throughout the 
Republic and in the works of contemporary commentators these poleis are considered as a 
―city‖, a word which in the modern and Aristotelian sense of a city-state describes as a large, 
autonomous, self-sufficient polis, with formal government, its institutions and a constitution. 
However, a polis, in the broad sense can be anything from a household to a city-state.
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As the polis for pigs, according to all commentators, is the first step in the development of the 
Kallipolis, it is, on my reading, most likely a village.
22 
No other explanation can justify its 
unity despite lack of formal government and the behaviour of its citizens in achieving their 
ends. The alternative, of not accepting the kōmē of producers is a village but rather a city-
state, is to rely on Socratic irony, and to hypothesise endlessly on why this village is anything 
from a fantasy to impossible. It is also to denigrate its citizens, ordinary dēmos, common rural 
people, as being ignorant, less than human, and incapable of making choices that would 
maintain the unity and justice of their community.  
To my knowledge, no other commentator has defined the polis for pigs as a village. Catherine 
McKeen, aware that size is an issue, says it fits between her micropolis (my hamlet) and the 
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luxurious city with respect to its way of life.  However, her polis for pigs is still big enough to 
require city hall and its ancillary functions, which I consider villages do not have. I believe that 
Christopher Rowe, in recognising that the polis for pigs ‗differs from any ordinary city in that 
the causes of conflict, and the things that cause the overdevelopment of our irrational desires, 
have not yet been introduced (2007, p. 44 [n22])... and has no political institutions [to 
counteract these]‘ (2007, p. 44), implies that the polis for pigs is small in size. He does not 
however delineate its size. 
If one accepts that the polis for pigs is indeed a kōmē, as previously described, and not a polis 
in the modern or Aristotelian sense of a city-state, then this must alter your consideration of 
this community. Being less populated, a society of small scale, the structure, functioning and 
behaviour of the citizens of the kōmē of producers will be different from those of a large polis 
or a city-state. 
4.1.3.Organisation in the kōmē of producers 
The kōmē of producers obviously does not have formal government and its institutions. This, 
according to its critics, is a major design fault of the kōmē and why such a polis is unlikely to 
exist. Their concern is how the kōmē of producers, as Socrates describes, can be stable and 
sustainable, if there are no political mechanisms to control its citizen‘s pleonexic tendencies. 
Without these mechanisms there is nothing preventing the polis for pigs from lapsing into a 
divided polis like the luxurious polis, or worse still, the social chaos of a state of nature. 
Villages in 5
th
 century BCE Greece tended to be self-contained and largely autonomous due 
to distance, geography and slow communication. Carter confirms that at this time, ‗country-
dwellers lived in towns and villages which were thought once to be autonomous, and 
although Athens had usurped control, the communities continued in many respects to 
function as before‘ (1986, p. 79). Dylan Futter, when referring to the perioikoi of Sparta, 
notes that ‗they were ‗free provincials‘ of semi-autonomous towns and hamlets across 
Laconia and Messinia‘ (2012, p. 40). This autonomy allows for the less regulated, contented 
village lifestyle McKeen proposes (2004, p. 73), but the citizens of the kōmē have to rely on 
their own resources to cope with day-to-day matters. 
The kōmē of producers, standing alone, is always at risk. This relates to fate, or as the citizens 
would have it, the wrath of the Gods. The external threats the kōmē faces include war and 
inclement weather conditions causing either drought or floods. Internally, the threats include 
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human and animal diseases, crop failure and disasters such as fire. Its citizens are ordinary 
people, so some conflicts of interests willoccur between individuals. There is a market, so 
disagreements over bartering and what constitutes fair wages will arise. Men and women live 
in close proximity to one another, giving rise to issues of fidelity. These are the type of 
conflicts between its citizens that would satisfy Adeimantus‘s response to Socrates, when the 
latter enquires where justice or injustice is in this polis. Justice, and conversely injustice, is in 
‗some need these people have of one another‘ (Republic, 372a).  
This kōmē, whose citizens are neither impoverished nor wealthy, is not unique, then in 5th 
century BCE Greece as now in the 21
st
 century AD. Carter confirms this assessment of 
ancient Greek villages when describing the quiet citizens of such rural communities as ‗[he] 
can amass no capital; his work leaves him no time to attend to affairs of the city; he is no 
meddling busybody‘ (1986, p. 77-78).  If its citizens have no wealth then the polis similarly 
has no wealth, so the kōmē of producers does not have the financial resources necessary to 
fund city hall and its institutions. 
Besides not having the money to fund city hall, the kōmē of producers, being a community of 
producers, does not have the type of citizensthat are necessary to populate the institutions of 
city hall; those with gold and silver in their souls. The kōmē’s citizens have bronze and iron 
in their souls and thus do not have the natural aptitude to do the work of city hall. 
Furthermore, as Carter points out, the citizens do not have the time to undertake such 
functions. A producer‘s time is devoted to his craft in order to secure the needs of the 
community.  
So villages do not have formal government and its institutions. That is for larger poleis, those 
with wealth and thus the finances to afford them. Following Rowe, that is still to come in the 
luxurious polis and the Kallipolis, and why Socrates, when describing this kōmē as a polis at 
‗its beginnings‘, does not include government in his discussion.  
However, not having formal government does not preclude this kōmē and its citizens from 
having characteristics that ensure it functions well, despite the risks it always faces. In this it 
is no different to any village. To function well on a day-to-day basis and to face fate when it 
arises, the kōmē of producers has that which makes it true and healthy. In the first instance, 
the articles of its association incorporating the principles of its founding, includes 
cooperating, sharing and helping each other to achieve their mutual benefit. Add to this the 
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principle of specialisation and the result is a polis with unity and economic and distributive 
justice, whose producer-citizens are happy because their needs are met.  
These collegial citizens are assisted in their quest by their fine character. Of a small polis, a 
village Plato describes in Laws, he notes its characteristics and those of its citizens as being 
‗not intolerably poor nor driven by poverty to quarrel with each other; but presumably they 
did not grow rich either… Now the community in which neither wealth nor poverty exists 
will generally produce the finest characters because tendencies to violence and crime, and 
feelings of jealousy and envy, simply do not arise‘ (Laws, 679b). All of these features suggest 
a society, albeit of small scale, in which the citizens are a cohesive community, in which 
conflicts of interest are minimal and therefore they can exist without formal government and 
its institutions. 
What the kōmē of producers has to ensure its existence and stability may seem inadequate by 
comparison with the Kallipolis, but it is a small polis and not complete as in the case of the 
Kallipolis. Its unity, and therefore its stability and capacity to meet adverse circumstances, is 
not ‗highly contingent… on lucky circumstances which allow individual self-interests to 
coincide‘ (McKeen, 2004, p. 71). That is all very well when things are going smoothly, but as 
McKeen points out, this is not sufficient ‗against changing fortunes, accidents and 
circumstances‘ (McKeen, 2004, p. 71). Enlightened self-regarding interest would then 
translate into every man for himself, whereas the mutual self-interest of the kōmē of 
producers would result in a collective effort to face and overcome the problem.  
4.1.4.Further considerations on justice and injustice in the kōmē of producers 
It is Crombie‘s contention that a polis without justice and injustice, which is how he views 
the kōmē of producers, cannot be, and therefore Socrates attempt at its description is a 
mistake. Consequently, Socrates‘ praise that it is true and healthy is by extension false. This 
is supported by other naysayers asserting that Socrates, in the Republic, does not return to 
justify or defend the polis for pigs because it is indefensible. Responding to Crombie and the 
other naysayers, Socrates does in fact return to a consideration of the polis for pigs (Rep. 
432d-433a, 443b-c). This is not to defend, augment or rescind his opinion of the polis for 
pigs, but to recognize that the polis for pigs has justice.  
On injustice, it is the contention of Jonas et al that Glaucon is unaware of the justice in the 
kōmē of producers and that his demand for a so-called civilised polis indicates that he does not 
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recognize his unnecessary appetitive desires are a feature of injustice. Turning to Nettleship, 
one‘s first impression of his view that the polis for pigs is ‗devoid of progress… [it] excludes 
the greater part of the elements that make up human life as we know it; it excludes civilisation‘ 
(1920, p. 72), is that it is simply ―Glauconic‖. He may however be calling for an elevated 
concept of civilised society, one that includes culture in the form of art, literature and 
philosophy, including natural philosophy, which he considers advances civilisation. In his text, 
as with Glaucon‘s call for a civilised society, there is little further to support this contention. 
Accepting this to be the case, Nettleship is obviously considering the kōmē of producers as a 
larger polis or a city-state. A city-state of producers does not exist, and producers have other 
things on their minds (Rep. 581a). Progress, culture and civilisation in the form required by 
Nettleship are not to be found in a village.They are yet to come in the luxurious polis and 
Kallipolis. 
However, Nettleship‘s assertion on the absence of progress in the polis for pigs is not true. The 
polis grows from a hamlet, in which very limited circumstances prevail, to the peaceful, 
flourishing, sustainable village with a market, currency and trade with other poleis. That is 
undoubtedly progress. It is however progress based on need, not pleonexia as in the luxurious 
polis, where ‗the desire to outdo others and get more and more‘ (Rep. 359c) wanton luxuries, 
leads to expansion, wealth, poverty and war, amongst other things.      
It is in the nature of things, that some villages will grow and coalesce with others and 
eventually form a luxurious polis. Once again Plato‘s Socrates has a template for the luxurious 
polis, his own polis Athens under the democratic and oligarchic constitutions of his youth and 
middle-age, and the tyranny of Syracuse under Dionysius I.
43,44
 
The luxurious polis is a large, populouspolis. In it, the kōmē of producers is preserved, 
perverted and expanded by the addition of numerous frivolous craftsmen (Rep. 373b). It is 
overblown as ‗the way of life [of the kōmē of producers]… won‘t satisfy some people…and is 
no longer adequate… to fill it with a multitude of things beyond what is necessary for a city‘ 
(Rep. 373a-b).   
Aptly described by McKeen, the luxurious polis is one in which: 
                                                          
43
Republic, Lee translation, Translator‘s Introduction, 1968, pp. 9-18. 
44
Chapter 1: the Life of Plato: Early years (Field, 1930, pp. 1-13) 
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‗appetites run wild…inhabitants develop tastes for meat, fish, cosmetics, perfumes, 
fashion, confections and prostitutes… all kinds of luxury goods are readily available, 
professions multiply, and the population explodes… rapid population growth fuels the 
need for more territory… [driving] the luxurious city to make war on its neighbours‘ 
(2004, p. 73).  
Injustice grows in this polis as the principle of specialisation is not strictly applied. Effective 
government is required to cure the luxurious polis‘s pleonexia induced fever.  ‗Socrates and his 
interlocutors will purify [it] step by step. By removing objectionable features… they gradually 
fashion the ideal city, where life will be moderately austere— as in the city of pigs— but 
civilised. Couches and tables are not removed; they remain at the top of the list of equipment 
for a civilised, cultured life‘ (Burnyeat, 1997, p. 23). 
The removal of injustice concurrently with excessive wanton luxury transforms the luxurious 
polis into the Kallipolis with the justice and unity found in the kōmē of producers. As Burnyeat 
notes this does not preclude civilisation and the progress which Nettleship considers the 
moderately austere life of the polis for pigs impedes. Over and above unity and justice, things 
that can improve society are maintained in the Kallipolis, and Burnyeat uses couches as an 
exemplar. ‗The social gathering with couches and tables is as good a place as any to localise 
the overall choice which is the main theme of the Republic, the choice between living well and 
living badly‘ (1997, p. 233).  
4.2 The primordial social relationship 
As unity in the polis, largely dependent on the decision of its citizens to congregate, cooperate 
and share to fulfil their needs, is so important to Socrates, one must accept that he understands 
its foundation. Does he therefore develop the kōmē of producers based on a positive primordial 
social relationship to buttress his argument? Or, as proposed by Devereux, is he just offering 
an alternate to Glaucon‘s pleonexia driven, pessimistic view on human nature in the state of 
nature? Does Socrates truly believe that citizens in the kōmē of producers are naturally capable 
of functioning in a mutually beneficial system of cooperation and communal living with no 
formal government? 
In Socrates‘ origin of the polis for pigs there is no prior state of nature with people continually 
at odds with each other until justice, and government, is imposed through law as proposed by 
Glaucon in his contractarian polis. So Devereux is correct in suggesting that Socrates is 
offering a more optimistic view on human nature in the origin of the kōmē of producers, a view 
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of cooperative humankind. He is, however, incorrect in considering this scenario, of 
humankind working cooperatively in the absence of government and law, is a condition that 
has never existed.  Over 12 000 years ago, a true state of human nature, with cooperation and 
sharing, was the norm for the First People, the San. Circumstances change and with the 
introduction of sedentism, this state of human nature is conserved in settled agrarian society.
53 
Justice is then achieved in this society through the principle of specialisation, following 
division of labour. 
It is no coincidence that the principles underlying unity, cooperation, sharing and justice, 
premised on division of labour and specialisation, in the kōmē of producers, are the same three 
principles presently considered central to the evolution and development of early settled 
agrarian society.
45
 It is a testament to Plato‘s powers of observation and analysis, that he 
recognised these principles and their significance, and records them in his description of the 
polis at ‗its beginnings‘, in the polis for pigs. If Aristotle, in Western political thought, is 
adjudged as the forefather of political science (Politics, 1252a15), then Plato, having 
documented settled agrarian society‘s underlying initial principles, is possibly the first social 
anthropologist. 
It is now accepted that humankind in the state of human nature, is naturally endowed with 
characteristics that equip it to cooperate and share, and is thus suited by nature for communal 
living to fulfil its needs. Socrates is correct in recording humankind‘s primordial social 
relationship as cooperation and sharing, and not predation and avarice. Pleonexia and its 
associated evils, including the circumstances of justice in a nominal state of nature, come 
later.  
It is in societies of small scale, as in the kōmē of producers, where natural unity and justice 
can exist in the absence of formal government. In summary, Socrates, in recording 
humankind‘s primordial social relationship, establishes that ‗society is natural and indeed 
necessary to man‘ (Wilson, 1977, p. 318), that needs have primacy over pleonexia in the 
origin and development of society, and that humans are naturally imbued with the ability to 
live harmoniously to achieve the common end of a good and happy life for all in the 
                                                          
45 In footnotes (2-5,11,15,16,38) I have briefly  documented  how early man made the transition from nomadic hunter-
gatherer life to settled village life about 10000- 12000 years ago. They detail that cooperation and sharing, division of labour 
and specialisation are central to this process and would have been observable in ancient Greek villages as they are in rural 
villages today. The difference from Plato‘s theory is the issue of what is natural; remembering what the ancient Greeks 
consider natural is different from today. Currently, cooperation and sharing and division of labour are considered innate, thus 
conserved from our animal heritage, and specialisation, following Massey5 is consequent on having the appropriate 
environment, that is having the time to develop it.     
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community.The necessary and sufficient mechanisms to attain the needs are cooperation and 
sharing— humankind‘s primordial social relationship. 
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5. Conclusion 
In the greater political scheme of the times the kōmē of producers is a small, semi-
autonomous, largely extra-political entity. Its citizens live moderately, according to their 
needs, necessary desires and the exigencies of their situation. The kōmē’s structure is, as in all 
small communities both then and now, without formal government for the reasons explained. 
There are however mechanisms in place, as discussed, to ensure that the polis functions well 
in the absence of formal government. These mechanisms include cooperation, sharing and 
natural Socratic justice. 
I believe that the kōmē of producers is based on reality, and exists. It is certainly not an 
impossible polis or one which only exists in a fantasy world, as this will diminish Socrates‘ 
search for justice. Its producer-citizens are no different from any other similar producers 
throughout the ages. This concurs with the naysayers who believe the citizens have the 
normal psychological features of producers, but are concerned that there is no government to 
curb their unnecessary appetitive desires. 
The polis for pigs has yet to experience wealth, with all its attendant pleonexic temptations, 
poverty and political problems. These are to be found in the luxurious polis, which is yet to 
come. It is in the luxurious polis that Socrates first introduces an institution of government, an 
army. Initially this provides for the luxurious polis‘s excessive wants by seizing other poleis‘ 
lands and serves to defend the luxurious polis‘s substantial wealth from invaders (Rep. 373d-
374a). The luxurious polis can clearly afford city hall and its institutions. 
The kōmē of producers does not have all the virtues of an ideal polis. There is no courage in the 
form of purple, dyed-in-the-wool Guardians (Rep. 429d-430b). It can at best muster a 
community response to threats, dressed in un-dyed cloth. It has no philosophy, but as Socrates 
describes in Theaetetus (Plato, 172d), and which is later wonderfully encapsulated by Thomas 
Hobbes in Leviathan, ‗Leisure is the mother of philosophy‘ (1651). The kōmē of producers 
does not yet have the luxury of such leisure time. Like other things the kōmē of producers does 
not have, following Rowe, this is yet to come in either the luxurious polis or the Kallipolis. 
But what this polis has, in toto, is the strong foundation Socrates needs for the Kallipolis. 
Without a solid footing, any government of a city-state will collapse, sooner rather than later.  
Socrates does not attempt to redefine or defend the kōmē of producers, because, its way of life 
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 and underpinning principles, as a foundation for the Kallipolis, is fit for purpose. As Strauss 
points out there is no need for lies or myths to justify the polis for pigs. ‗This is one reason 
Socrates calls it ―the true city‖, i.e. the truthful city‘ (1964, p. 98).  
This community is partially virtuous, good to the extent that virtue allows, and its producer-
citizens ‗are made as happy as it is possible for them to be‘ (Reeve, 1998, p. 176), consequent 
on the satisfaction of communal before personal interest (Rep. 412d-e, 420c, 421b-c). This is 
possible because of the unwritten articles of its association, its natural justice and because 
‗[each citizen] loves something most of all when he believes that the same things are 
advantageous to it as to himself and supposes that if it does well, he‘ll do well, and that if it 
does badly, then he will do badly too‘ (Rep. 412d). 
This then opposes Annas‘ opinion that the polis for pigs ‗has not given the first city a clear 
place in the Republic’s moral argument‘ (1981, p. 78). The presence in its precincts of the 
division of labour and specialisation, underpinning economic justice, with functional 
reciprocity enhancing the supplying of the needs for the ‗greater good of the whole [of the 
community]‘ (Annas, 1981, p. 75), giving rise to distributive justice and concomitant unity, are 
surely reasons enough to justify the polis for pigs’ role in the Republic and a place in Socrates‘ 
moral argument. 
The kōmē of producers is not the best polis, but it is the best polis it can be given the prevailing 
circumstances. It has the essential virtue— justice; it also has moderation, of a kind, in that its 
citizens ‗rule the pleasures of drink, sex and food for themselves‘ (Rep. 389d-e) and thus they 
exhibit ‗a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desire‘ (Rep. 430e). It is 
eutopia, a good place, both in and of itself and a good place in which its citizen can live. 
However, it is yet to become a cornerstone of the Kallipolis, the most beautiful polis, or 
Utopia. More correctly the Kallipolis is outopia- ideal but nowhere, except perhaps in heaven, 
for anyone to avail themselves of its citizenship (Rep. 592b). Until then, the kōmē of producers 
is the true and healthy polis, because as Socrates correctly predicts, and human history records, 
‗until philosophers rule as kings…[or] kings and leading men philosophise…until political 
power and philosophy entirely coincide… cities will have no rest from evil… nor will the 
human race‘ (Rep. 473c-d). 
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6. Postscript 
‗Hunting and gathering life… left its mark on our minds just as it did on our bodies. On top 
of the technical skills of planning, coordination and technology, there was, equally important, 
the social skill of cooperation. A sense of common goals and values, a desire to further the 
common good, cooperation was more than simply individuals working together. It became a 
set of rules of conduct, of morals, and understanding of right and wrong in a complex social 
system… The great British biologist Conrad Waddington put it best: Through evolution 
humans became the ethical animal‘ (Leakey & Lewin, 1992, pp.304-305). 
I began this dissertation with a preface, describing a coincidence of ideas centred on a 
concern for the welfare of the polis. Plato, in the Republic, offers a solution— humankind 
must live according to its needs and find a way to govern their desire for excessive wants, if 
unity and justice areto prevail in the polis. I end with a postscript, returning to Plato‘s 
solution and its underlying principles. 
6.1 The Songs of the Daughters of Necessity (Rep. 617c) 
6.1.1. Lachesis, the kōmē of producers 
‗Or aren‘t virtue and wealth so opposed that if they were set on a scales, they‘d always 
incline in opposite directions? That‘s right. So, when wealth and the wealthy are valued or 
honoured in a city, virtue and good people are valued less. Clearly. And what is valued is 
always practiced, and what isn‘t valued is neglected‘ (Rep. 550e-551a). 
Almost two thousand five hundred years ago, Socrates initiated the Western tradition of 
philosophy, seeking truth by asking interminable questions of his contemporaries. Through 
the answers and counter questions appraising the premises of the argument, the debate 
progressed.  Socrates‘ method, the elenchus, is used to probe issues such as justice, injustice, 
courage, wisdom, beauty, friendship, love and many more.  
Plato is never heard in these dialogues, but it is assumed that his own views are also included, 
particularly in his middle and later writings including the Republic. One of his objectives in 
the Republic is to ‗design the ideal society‘ (Burnyeat, 1997, pp. 217). He begins in Book II, 
having relinquished the elenchus, by describing the polis for pigs (Rep. 369a-372d) in his 
search for the origin of justice. This is the polis vilified by Glaucon as the polis for pigs, but 
lauded by Socrates as true and healthy. 
I suggest that the polis for pigs is a village, its citizens are ordinary farmers and tradesmen 
with normal needs and desires, who choose to establish this village as a public partnership. Its 
44 
 
circumstances of justice are simply their reasoned recognition of their inability to provide for 
their needs as individuals, and thus their decision to work together as partners and helpers, 
cooperating and sharing. This is the natural basis of unity in their community. It is augmented 
by justice, the natural basisof which is the principle of specialisation which follows from 
division of labour. Each of these elements—unity and justice—make the polis for pigs 
naturally true and healthy. 
The polis for pigs’ natural justice, and unity based on humankind‘s primordial social 
relationship, cooperation and sharing, is the start of Plato‘s answer to ‗what is right both in 
public and private affairs‘ (7th Letter, 325b-c). It is the bedrock, or solid foundation, on which 
Socrates builds the Kallipolis. The Kallipolis is arguably an early account of 
communitarianism, placing the good before the right, in which its justice and unity are now 
conventional. Like all strong foundations, however, the polis for pigs is largely buried, 
unseen and ignored, and yet still virtuous. 
6.1.2. Clotho, the Luxurious Polis 
‗What makes ancient Greece important for us is that it was faced by essentially the same 
political, philosophic and religious problems as ourselves… our age, like theirs, is one in 
which all the foundations are breaking down (Dickinson, 1931, pp. 13-14). 
Things change. Perhaps beginning with Aristotle,
46
 it is a long and momentous journey to 
Rawls‘ ―justice as fairness‖ where: 
‗[E]ach person possesses an inviolability founded on justice… [wherein] the liberties 
of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to 
political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests‘ (1971, pp. 3-4).  
According to Michael Sandel
47
 this:  
‗is a liberal vision that gives pride of place to justice, fairness and individual rights… 
[and] seeks not to promote any particular ends, but enables its citizens to pursue their 
own ends consistent with a similar liberty for all; it therefore must be governed by 
principles that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good‘ (1984, p.82). 
                                                          
46 Miller, 1996, pp. 873-907. 
47Sandel, 1984, pp. 81-96.  
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Rawls‘ contractarian liberal philosophy, giving precedence to individual rights, places the 
right before the good. And so the debate over Plato‘s concern about ‗what is right both in 
public and private affairs‘ (7th Letter, 325b-c) continues to this day, but in what is perceived 
to be a vastly different world. 
Is it a different world? ‗All the cities of the present age are badly governed‘ (7th Letter, 325b-
c) by the same political systems present in Plato‘s day— tyranny, oligarchy, timocracy, 
democracy. However, a new, insidious form of rule has emerged— ‗corporatocracy‘ (Sachs, 
2011, p. 105). In a Thrasymachean twist, strong corporate lobbies have usurped power from 
weak, ineffectual governments.
48
 Our towns, cities, nations and the global polis are riven and 
fractious, possibly more so than Plato‘s city-states, by amongst other things politics, religion, 
colour, gender and sexual orientation schisms, and especially wealth and poverty.  
The global wealth GINI coefficient
49
, a measure of the inequality of wealth, has never been 
greater. One percent of the world‘s population (70 million out of 7 billion people) own almost 
half of the global wealth.
50
 All of the evils induced by pleonexia, and more, abound in our 
poleis. Pleonexia has become an artform, to be viewed as images of puppets prance on I-
Screens (television, ι-Pads, ι-Phones and other assorted devices), intermittently interrupted by 
messages from advertisers, latter-day poets, as to how we can acquire anything we want. We 
live in the global luxurious polis and injustice abounds. 
The more things change, the more they stay the same. But there are current issues, recognised 
by Socrates, which have grown to excessive proportions that make it imperative that a true 
philosophy is found to provide solutions to humankind‘s present predicament. 
6.1.3. Atropos, the Kallipolis? 
‗They‘ll enjoy sex with one another but bear no more children than their resources allow least 
they fall into either poverty or war‘(Plato, Republic, 372b-c). 
‗As long as it is willing to remain one city, it may continue to grow, but it cannot grow 
beyond that point‘ (Plato, Republic, 423b). 
Socrates understands the relationship between population size and available resources, and 
the consequences of not aligning them— wealth and poverty existing side by side fomenting 
                                                          
48From ―The Rigged Game‖in Jeffrey Sachs‘ The Price of Civilization (2011, pp. 105-131). 
49
 [http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Gini_coefficient.html] 
50Oxfam, ―Working for the Few‖ [http://www.oxfam.org/en/research/working-few] 
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revolution (Rep. 422a). Two millennia later, Thomas Malthus gives greater expression to this 
debate in An Essay on the Principle of Population.
51
 His refined argument is much criticised 
because his doomsday prediction has not materialised. However, that is due to both time and 
circumstance. Humankind‘s ingenuity, as opposed to their minimal rationality, initially finds 
new ways of exploiting existing resources to satisfy the needs of the exploding population. 
However, Malthus‘s time is coming. Neither Socrates nor Malthus could have anticipated the 
world‘s current imbroglio, in which the excessive population growth and unwarranted 
consumption of finite resources to achieve wealth, has damaged our environment to the point 
where future food and water security is imperilled. 
Edward O Wilson, in the Forward to Jeffrey Sachs‘ book Common Wealth52, notes that 
humankind has now produced a global population: 
‗dangerously close to the limit of Earth‘s available resources … [and] we have arrived 
at a narrow window of opportunity … [as] almost all the crises that afflict the world 
economy are ultimately environmental in origin…[but] the evidence is compelling: 
we need to redesign our social and economic policies before we wreck the planet. At 
stake is humankind‘s one shot at a permanently bright future‘. 
In my opinion, the crisis that afflicts our world economy is the outward symptom of a malign 
malaise. The global polis‘s circumstances of justice, or more correctly injustice, are 
absolutely apparent. Poverty is at unprecedented levels, with the world‘s poorest one billion 
people in a poverty trap in which they are barely able to survive. They are subject to 
undernourishment and disease and are denied access to health care and the basic amenities of 
potable water and sanitation.
53
  Fulfilling their fundamental needs is barely, if at all possible. 
To make matters worse there are billions of others who live perilously close to this desperate 
existence. Global injustice is of such epic proportions that war, revolution and strife between 
nations, neighbourhoods and neighbours is a daily occurrence. It is available for viewing on 
your I-Screen 24 hours a day, seven days a week.    
The imperatives are obvious. Never before has there been a greater urgency for a ‗true 
philosophy, that… from it we can come to recognise what is right both in public and private 
affairs‘ (7th Letter, 325b-c). In our present global polis, national interests have been added to 
                                                          
51
Thomas Malthus, 1798, pp. 1-125. 
52Sachs, 2008, Forward. 
53Sachs, 2008, pp. 30-31. 
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personal and public interests. Furthermore, apart from having to regulate individual 
pleonexia, governments now have the additional responsibility of disentangling themselves 
from big business and regulating corporate greed.   
If we are to succeed at the one shot we have at a permanently bright future for humankind, a 
global accommodation is required to meet these competing demands, and to strive for the 
unity in the polis Socrates so obviously considers virtuous. This accommodation is necessary 
not only for the overall good and happiness of people, but to ensure the protection of their 
home, which is the source of their present and future needs and thus wellbeing— Mother 
Earth. Once before, in a rare moment of enlightenment, such an accord was achieved. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ‗as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations‘ was signed in 1948.54 Establishing a framework within which people 
pursue their own conception of the good, the common good, presumably its expected 
outcome, has yet to be achieved. 
If we do not achieve an accommodation, a true philosophy, the alternative is ‗a clash of 
civilisations [which] could well result from the rising tensions, and it could truly be our last 
and utterly devastating clash‘ (Sachs, 2008, p.4). These are the words of a man who has 
escaped the Cave and sought knowledge and Truth in the sunlight, not only from the 
highways but more importantly from the byways and the back roads. Yet Jeffrey Sachs, and 
the few like-reasoned, kindred spirits, seems not to be heard, back in the Cave, above the 
pleonexic cacophony of an avaricious minority— the ―some who won‘t be satisfied‖. The 
latter do not accept a way of life which requires living to their needs (Rep. 373a), and thus 
necessary desires, preferring instead the accumulation of obscene wealth. 
Such a true philosophy, premised in the first instance on humankind‘s primordial social 
relationship, the natural ability to cooperate and share, is required for the development of a 
modern day iteration of the global Kallipolis. It further requires the incorporation of agreed 
concepts of justice, to accomplish the fulfilment of the needs and satisfaction of the necessary 
desires of the vast majority, if not all, whilst simultaneously avoiding the evils of pleonexia. 
It must be consistent with current and future realities.  
Thereafter comes thereal difficulty, with apologies to Michael Sandel but following Socrates 
(Rep. 473d) — to ensure that ‗political philosophy [does not] reside at a distance from the 
                                                          
54Universal Declaration of Human Rights. [http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/] 
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world… [so that] principles are [not] one thing, politics another… [in order that] our best 
efforts ―live up‖ to our ideals…and do not founder on the gap between theory and practice‘ 
(Sandel, 1984, p. 81). This will require the courage and wisdom of Socrates in taking the 
philosophy to the agora. 
Achieving the modern Kallipolis, that most beautiful place, may seem a bridge too far; we are 
human and just as in Socrates‘ time, it may be Outopia. We must however endeavour as the 
consequences of not trying are too daunting to contemplate.  
The time is now. Tomorrow and the next are working days. The day after is too late. 
_________________ 
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Annexure I— Demography of the Kallipolis 
It is difficult to determine what the population of the Kallipolis is to be able to compare it 
with the polis for pigs. Socrates considers the Kallipolis should be of a suitable size to ensure 
that it does not grow beyond a point which will destroy its unity (Rep. 423b-c). He says of the 
Kallipolis ‗even if it has only 1000 men to fight for it…,‘ (Rep. 423a). To fully support 1000 
male Guardians (there could also be female Guardians in addition) with housing, food, 
clothing, armour and weapons, would require considerable effort from the rest of the 
population. 
 Assuming four additional citizens (adult males) to support each Guardian, this would suggest 
4000 more citizens, giving a total of 5000 citizens. This figure corresponds with the citizen 
population of Plato‘s practical, good city in Laws, the suggested maximum citizen population 
being 5040 (Plato, Laws, 737e). Add to this women (5040), children (assuming 3-4 per 
family, that is an average 3.5 children per family), and a conservative estimate for the 
population of the Kallipolis is 27 720 people. Metics, foreigners and slaves are not considered 
in this calculation, but if present could arguably double the population.  Thus the Kallipolis is 
small by comparison to Athens with a male, adult citizen population alone of some 60 000 
people in 431 BCE, which is reduced by war, plague and famine to 25 000 in 400 BCE. 
(Hansen, 1998, p. 28). 
Recognising the comparative demographic (polis population) size and the developmental 
relationship, of the first kōmē to the luxurious polis and the Kallipolis, is important to the 
development of my thesis.  
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